ONGOING RISKS
The first threat lies in the potential formation of splinter groups by other senior leaders and members who might disagree with the dissolution.
Most JI members are likely to follow the call to disband. Not only was the announcement sanctioned by a sizeable number of respected authority figures, JI members recruited in the past decade have been largely disciplined to follow orders as a result of a revamped recruitment process and internal policing system.
However, there are militant factions in JI that might disagree. Indeed, there has been precedence of such factions operating independently.
In 2019, Imaruddin took advantage of the sudden power vacuum following longtime leader Para Wijayanto’s arrest to plan attacks – an act JI has forbidden since 2011. His faction made plans to attack Chinese-Indonesian owned stores in Banten, West Java and East Java, amassed over 260 million rupiah (US$16,060), and procured two firearms before being arrested.
The second threat lies in efforts to infiltrate popular religious organisations and amass support for the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia.
JI’s preferred strategy in the past decade has shifted from carrying out violence to conducting dakwah (preaching). As early as 2010, some JI scholars stated that “if establishing an Islamic state were the goal, above-ground organisations like the Islamic Defenders Front had made more progress than JI”.
Ultimately, JI recognised that it does not need to lead dakwah initiatives. It has been releasing JI seniors from the organisation’s structure to take on community leadership roles. The most famous example of this is Ahmad Zain-An-Najah, who was part of top clerical body Indonesian Ulema Council when he was arrested for JI links in 2021.
JI could continue dakwah efforts independently to promote JI extremist ideology even as the organisation ceases to operate.
ONGOING RISKS
The first threat lies in the potential formation of splinter groups by other senior leaders and members who might disagree with the dissolution.
Most JI members are likely to follow the call to disband. Not only was the announcement sanctioned by a sizeable number of respected authority figures, JI members recruited in the past decade have been largely disciplined to follow orders as a result of a revamped recruitment process and internal policing system.
However, there are militant factions in JI that might disagree. Indeed, there has been precedence of such factions operating independently.
In 2019, Imaruddin took advantage of the sudden power vacuum following longtime leader Para Wijayanto’s arrest to plan attacks – an act JI has forbidden since 2011. His faction made plans to attack Chinese-Indonesian owned stores in Banten, West Java and East Java, amassed over 260 million rupiah (US$16,060), and procured two firearms before being arrested.
The second threat lies in efforts to infiltrate popular religious organisations and amass support for the formation of an Islamic state in Indonesia.
JI’s preferred strategy in the past decade has shifted from carrying out violence to conducting dakwah (preaching). As early as 2010, some JI scholars stated that “if establishing an Islamic state were the goal, above-ground organisations like the Islamic Defenders Front had made more progress than JI”.
Ultimately, JI recognised that it does not need to lead dakwah initiatives. It has been releasing JI seniors from the organisation’s structure to take on community leadership roles. The most famous example of this is Ahmad Zain-An-Najah, who was part of top clerical body Indonesian Ulema Council when he was arrested for JI links in 2021.
JI could continue dakwah efforts independently to promote JI extremist ideology even as the organisation ceases to operate.
Summary: "Persistent Threats"
The article discusses the ongoing threats posed by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) despite its call for dissolution. One primary threat is the potential formation of splinter groups by dissenting senior leaders and militant factions. Historical examples, such as Imaruddin’s independent attacks in 2019, highlight the risk of rogue elements within JI. Another significant threat is JI’s strategy of infiltrating popular religious organizations to garner support for an Islamic state in Indonesia. Shifting from violence to preaching (dakwah), JI has embedded its ideology in community leadership roles, as seen with Ahmad Zain-An-Najah’s involvement in the Indonesian Ulema Council before his arrest in 2021. Even if JI formally disbands, its extremist ideology could persist through independent dakwah efforts.